We consider secure communication over a two-user Gaussian interference channel, where each transmitter sends a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. For this setting, we identify a regime where the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without cooperative jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The results are proved by first considering the deterministic interference channel model and identifying a regime in which a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming is optimal in terms of secure sum capacity. For the symmetric case of the deterministic model, this simple scheme is optimal if and only if the interference-to-signal ratio (in channel strengths) is no more than 2/3.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of information-theoretic secrecy was first introduced by Shannon in his seminal work [1] , which studied a secure communication in the presence of a private key that is revealed to both transmitter and legitimate receiver but not to the eavesdropper. Later, Wyner introduced the notion of secure capacity via a degraded wiretap channel, in which a transmitter intends to send a confidential message to a legitimate receiver by hiding it from a degraded eavesdropper [2] . The secure capacity is the maximum rate at which the confidential message can be transmitted reliably and securely to the legitimate receiver. Wyner's result was subsequently generalized to the non-degraded wiretap channel by Csiszàr and Körner [3] , and the Gaussian wiretap channel by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [4] . This line of secure capacity research has been extended to many multiuser channels, most notably, the broadcast channels [5] - [9] , multiple access channels [10] - [15] , and the interference channels [5] , [16] - [26] .
In the line of secure capacity research, cooperative jamming has been proposed extensively to improve the achievable secure rates in many channels (see [5] , [10] , [21] , [22] and references therein). In particular, cooperative jamming has been proposed in [21] and [22] to achieve the optimal secure sum degrees-offreedom (DoF) in the interference channel with confidential messages, wiretap channel with helpers, multiple access wiretap channel, and the broadcast channel with confidential messages. The basic idea of the cooperative jamming scheme is to send jamming signals to confuse the potential eavesdroppers, while keeping legitimate receivers' abilities to decode the desired messages. This might involve a cooperation between the transmitters, and a careful design on the direction and/or power of the cooperative jamming signals (see [5] , [10] , [21] , [22] ). It is therefore implicit that the cooperative jamming schemes might incur some extra overhead, e.g., due to network coordination, channel state information (CSI) acquisition, and power consumption.
In this work we study the secure communication schemes without cooperative jamming. In particular, for a two-user Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, we identify a regime in which the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter, without cooperative jamming, and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (in short, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The secrecy offered by this GWC-TIN scheme is informationtheoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding method at any unintended receiver (eavesdropper). In this simple scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the information of the channel phases. Therefore, 2 the overhead associated with acquiring channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) is minimal for the GWC-TIN scheme.
The results are proved by first considering the deterministic interference channel model (see [27] ) and identifying a regime in which a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming is optimal in terms of secure sum capacity. In this simple scheme, the data is simply transmitted over the least significant signal bits such that no interference is leaked to the unintended receiver. In this way, the deterministic interference channel is decomposed into two parallel channels -in each channel the transmitter sends confidential data to its legitimate receiver without the cooperation from the other transmitter. For the symmetric case of the deterministic model, this simple scheme is optimal if and only if the interference-to-signal ratio (in channel strengths) is no more than 2/3.
To prove the optimality of the aforementioned schemes, we derive a new secure capacity bound for each of the two interference channel models. In our proof the approach is different from the genie-aided approach that is commonly used in the settings without secrecy constraints (see [28] ). In the genie-aided approach, some genie-aided information is typically provided to the receivers, which might give a loose bound in our setting.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model, as well as the simple scheme without cooperative jamming, for each of the Gaussian and deterministic interference channels. Section III provides the main results of this work. The proofs are provided in Section IV, Section V and the appendices. The work is concluded in Section VI. Throughout this work, I(•), H(•) and h(•) denote the mutual information, entropy and differential entropy, respectively. (•) T denotes the transpose operation. F q 2 denotes a set of q-tuples of binary numbers. (•) + = max{0, •}. Logarithms are in base 2. Unless for some specific parameters, matrix, scalar, and vector are usually denoted by the italic uppercase symbol (e.g., S), italic lowercase symbol (e.g., s), and the bold italic lowercase symbol (e.g., s), respectively. s ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) denotes that the random variable s has a circularly symmetric complex normal distribution with zero mean and σ 2 variance.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES
This section provides the system models for Gaussian interference channel and deterministic interference channel, respectively. For each model, a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming is also discussed in this section.
A. Gaussian interference channel
We begin with a two-user Gaussian interference channel. The channel output at receiver k at time t is
t = 1, 2, · · · , n, where x (t) is the channel input at transmitter subject to a normalized power constraint E|x (t)| 2 ≤ 1, z k (t) ∼ CN (0, 1) is additive white Gaussian noise at receiver k, √ P α k and θ k represent the magnitude and phase of the channel between transmitter and receiver k, where P ≥ 1 is a nominal power value 1 . The exponent α k ≥ 0 represents the channel strength of the link between transmitter and receiver k. We assume that each transmitter knows the channel strengths {α k } k, but not necessarily the phases {θ k } k, , while each receiver knows all the channel strengths and phases.
For this interference channel, each transmitter wishes to send a confidential message to its legitimate receiver. Specifically transmitter k wishes to send to receiver k a message w k that is uniformly chosen 3 from a set W k {1, 2, · · · , 2 nR k }, where R k is the rate (bits/channel use) of this message and n is the total number of channel uses, k = 1, 2. At transmitter k, a stochastic function f k : W k → X n k , k = 1, 2 is employed to encode the message. A secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if for any > 0 there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver can decode its own message reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than ,
and the messages are kept secret such that
where y n k represents the n-length channel output of receiver k, k = 1, 2. The secure capacity region C is the closure of the set of all achievable secure rate pairs. The secure sum capacity is defined as:
The secure sum generalized degrees-of-freedom (GDoF) is defined as
B. Deterministic interference channel One way to better understand the capacity of the Gaussian channels is to study their linear deterministic models (see [27] ). In this work we also consider a two-user deterministic interference channel. By following the common convention (see [25] , [27] ), we assume that the input-output relation of the deterministic channel is given by
where x k (t) = x k,1 (t), x k,2 (t), · · · , x k,q (t) T ∈ F q 2 denotes the channel input of transmitter k at time t; y k (t) ∈ F q 2 denotes the channel output of receiver k at time t, k = 1, 2, q max{m 11 , m 12 , m 21 , m 22 }; S is a q × q lower shift matrix, and S q−m 21 x 1 (t) = 0, · · · , 0, x 1,1 (t), · · · , x 1,m 21 (t) T . ⊕ denotes modulo 2 addition. The nonnegative integers m kk and m k denote the number of information bits that can be communicated per channel use over the direct and cross links, respectively, for , k ∈ {1, 2}, = k. For the symmetric case of the deterministic channel model, we let
and let
that is a normalized interference parameter.
Similarly to the Gaussian case, transmitter k wishes to send to its receiver k a message w k that is uniformly chosen from a set W k = {1, 2, · · · , 2 nR k }, k = 1, 2. Transmitter k uses a stochastic function g k : W k → F q×n 2 to encode the message. A secure rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if for any > 0 there exists a sequence of n-length codes such that each receiver can decode its own message reliably (cf. (2) ) and the messages are kept secret, i.e., I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n and I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) ≤ n . The secure capacity region C and sum capacity C sum are defined similarly as in the Gaussian case (cf. (5)).
x 1 Fig. 1 . The scheme without using cooperative jamming for the deterministic channel: the case with m11 = m22 = 3, m21 = 2, and m12 = 1.
In this case, transmitter 1 simply sends its private data over (m11 − m21) + = 1 least significant bit of the signal, while transmitter 2 sends its private data over (m22 − m12) + = 2 least significant bits of the signal, without using cooperative jamming. The transmission of private data is secure from the unintended receiver.
C. The scheme without using cooperative jamming for the deterministic channel model
Let us discuss a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming (in short, WoCJ scheme) for the deterministic channel defined in Section II-B. In this scheme, transmitter k simply sends a total of (m kk − m k ) + bits of private data over the least significant signal bits without using cooperative jamming, for k, ∈ {1, 2}, k = and (•) + = max{0, •}. The transmission of the private data is secure from the unintended receiver (eavesdropper) because the private data is not seen by the unintended receiver. In this simple way the scheme achieves the following secure rate pair: Fig. 1 depicts the scheme for a specific setting with m 11 = m 22 = 3, m 21 = 2, and m 12 = 1. Since the data is transmitted over the least significant signal bits, it implies that: 1) no confidential information is leaked to the unintended receiver; 2) no interference is leaked to the unintended receiver 2 . In this way, the interference channel is decomposed into two parallel wiretap channels -in each wiretap channel the transmitter sends confidential data to its legitimate receiver without the cooperation from the other transmitter (see Fig. 1 ).
D. The scheme without using cooperative jamming for the Gaussian channel model
The scheme discussed in Section II-C can be extended to the Gaussian channel in a similar way. For this Gaussian interference channel, each interference signal leaked to the unintended receiver is scaled down to the noise level by applying a proper power allocation strategy. Due to the noisy interference, the Gaussian interference channel is approximately decomposed into two parallel wiretap Gaussian channels. Therefore, in this scheme each transmitter simply employs a Gaussian wiretap codebook (GWC) to guarantee the secrecy without using cooperative jamming, while each receiver simply treats interference as noise (TIN) when decoding its desired message. We call it as a GWC-TIN scheme. Note that the secrecy offered by this GWC-TIN scheme is information-theoretic secrecy, which holds for any decoding method at any eavesdropper. Some details of the scheme are discussed as follows.
1) Gaussian wiretap codebook: To build the codebook, transmitter k generates a total of 2 n(R k +R k ) independent codewords v n k with each element independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a circularly-symmetric complex normal distribution with variance P −β k , k = 1, 2, for some R k , R k and β k ≥ 0 that will be designed specifically later on. The codebook B k is defined as a set of the labeled codewords:
To transmit the message w k , transmitter k at first selects a bin (sub-codebook) B k (w k ) that is defined as
and then randomly chooses a codeword v n k from the selected bin according to a uniform distribution. Since this scheme will not use cooperative jamming, the chosen codeword v n k will be mapped exactly as a channel input sequence by transmitter k, that is,
Based on this one-to-one mapping and Gaussian codebook, it implies that
Then, the received signals take the following forms (removing the time index for simplicity):
(cf. (1)). In the above equations, the average power is noted under each summand term.
2) Treating interference as noise: In terms of decoding, each intended receiver simply treats interference as noise. This implies that receiver k can decode the codeword v n k (w k , w k ) with arbitrarily small error probability when n gets large and the rate of the codeword (i.e., R k +R k ) satisfies the following condition:
(cf. [29] ). Note that R k and R k represent the rates of the secure message w k and the confusion message w k , respectively (cf. (13)). Once the codeword v n k (w k , w k ) is decoded, the message w k can be decoded directly from the codebook mapping. Let us set
for some > 0 and k, ∈ {1, 2}, k = . Obviously, R k and R k designed in (18) and (19) satisfy the condition in (17) .
3) Secure rate: From the proof of [22, Theorem 2] (or [5, Theorem 2]) it implies that, given the above wiretap codebook and the rates designed in (18) and (19), the messages w 1 and w 2 are secure from their eavesdroppers, that is, I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n and I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) ≤ n . Therefore, by letting → 0, the scheme achieves the secure rate pair R 1 = I(v 1 ; y 1 ) − I(v 1 ; y 2 |v 2 ) and R 2 = I(v 2 ; y 2 ) − I(v 2 ; y 1 |v 1 ). Due to the Gaussian inputs and outputs (see (14) , (15) and (16)), this achievable secure rate pair is expressed as
for some β 1 , β 2 ≥ 0. By setting β 1 = α 21 and β 2 = α 12 , then the interference at each receiver is scaled down to the noise level (see (15) and (16)) and the achievable secure rate pair becomes
Note that in this GWC-TIN scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the channel phases.
III. MAIN RESULTS
This section provides the main results for the deterministic channel model and Gaussian channel model, respectively.
A. Results for the deterministic channel
For the deterministic channel defined in Section II-B, we identify a regime where a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming (i.e., WoCJ scheme, described in Section II-C) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity. The result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For the two-user deterministic interference channel defined in Section II-B, where m k denotes the level of bits of the channel from transmitter to receiver k, ∀k, ∈ {1, 2}, if the following conditions are satisfied,
then a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming (described in Section II-C) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity, which is
Proof. As discussed in Section II-C, WoCJ scheme achieves a secure sum rate of (m 22 − m 12 ) + + (m 11 − m 21 ) + without using cooperative jamming. To prove its optimality, we provide an outer bound on the secure capacity region of the deterministic channel, given in Lemma 1 (see Section IV). The derived outer bound reveals that the secure sum rate achieved by WoCJ scheme is indeed optimal if the conditions in (22) and (23) are satisfied. In Remark 1 (see Section IV), we show how to prove Theorem 1 by using the derived outer bound.
Example 1. To interpret the result in Theorem 1, we consider a setting with m 11 = m 22 = 3, m 21 = 2 and m 12 = 1. For this setting the conditions in (22) and (23) are satisfied. This implies from Theorem 1 that WoCJ scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity without using cooperative jamming. For this setting the optimal secure sum capacity is characterized as C sum = 3 bits/channel use.
For the symmetric case with m d = m 11 = m 22 , m c = m 12 = m 21 , and α = mc m d (see (9) and (10)), Theorem 1 reveals that if the following condition is satisfied,
then WoCJ scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity, C sum = 2(m d − m c ), without using cooperative jamming. More interestingly, for this symmetric case, condition (25) is indeed sufficient and Fig. 2 . Normalized sum capacity vs. α for the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel with and without secrecy constraints, where α = mc m d . Note that a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming achieves the optimal secure sum capacity if and only if α ∈ [0, 2 3 ].
necessary for WoCJ scheme to be optimal in terms of secure sum capacity 3 . A more general result on the symmetric case is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel defined in Section II-B, the normalized secure sum capacity Csum m d is characterized as
Moreover, a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming, that is, WoCJ scheme, achieves the optimal secure sum capacity if and only if α ∈ [0, 2 3 ]. Proof. The converse is relegated to Section IV (see Lemma 1 and Remark 2 in Section IV). For the achievability, note that WoCJ scheme achieves a secure sum rate of 2(m d − m c ) for this symmetric setting, again, without using cooperative jamming. The secure sum rate achieved by WoCJ scheme is optimal when α ∈ [0, 2 3 ] -the optimality is proved through the derived converse. For the other regimes with strictly positive secure sum capacity, i.e., α ∈ ( 2 3 , 1) ∪ (1, 2), the secure sum rate achieved by WoCJ scheme is not optimal. When α ∈ ( 2 3 , 1) ∪ (1, 2), the schemes with cooperative jamming have been shown in [25] to achieve the optimal secure sum capacity of this symmetric setting (see Appendix C for the sketch of the schemes). , as well as the normalized sum capacity without secrecy constraint (cf. [28] ), for the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel. Note that WoCJ scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity if and only if α ∈ [0, 2 3 ]. Also note that secrecy constraint incurs no capacity penalty if and only if α ∈ [0, 1 2 ].
B. Results for the Gaussian channel
Let us now focus on the Gaussian channel defined in Section II-A. For this Gaussian channel, we identify a regime where the simple scheme without cooperative jamming, that is, GWC-TIN scheme described in Section II-D, achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, where α k denotes the channel strength from transmitter to receiver k, ∀k, ∈ {1, 2}, if the following the conditions are satisfied,
then the simple scheme of using Gaussian wiretap codebook at each transmitter (without using cooperative jamming) and treating interference as noise at each intended receiver (that is, GWC-TIN scheme) achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. Moreover, given the conditions of (27) and (28), the optimal secure sum capacity C sum satisfies
where the lower bound is achieved by GWC-TIN scheme.
Proof. As discussed in Section II-D, GWC-TIN scheme achieves a secure sum rate of R 1 + R 2 = log 1 + P α 11 −α 21 2 (20) and (21)). To prove the optimality of GWC-TIN scheme, we provide an upper bound on the secure sum capacity of the Gaussian channel, given in Lemma 3 (see Section V). The derived upper bound reveals that, if the conditions in (27) and (28) are satisfied, then the achievable secure sum rate of GWC-TIN scheme indeed approaches the secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. In Remark 3 (see Section V), we show how to prove Theorem 3 by using the derived upper bound.
Example 2. To interpret the result in Theorem 3, we consider a setting with α 11 = 2, α 22 = 3, α 21 = 1 and α 12 = 2. For this setting the conditions in (27) and (28) are satisfied. This implies from Theorem 3 that GWC-TIN scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap, without using cooperative jamming.
In (29), a secure sum capacity is characterized to within a constant gap. This directly implies the characterization of the secure sum GDoF. The following GDoF result is concluded from Theorem 3.
Corollary 1 (GDoF result). For the two-user Gaussian interference channel, if the conditions of (27) and (28) are satisfied, then GWC-TIN scheme achieves the optimal secure sum GDoF, which is
For the symmetric case with α 11 = α 22 and α 12 = α 21 , Theorem 3 directly implies that if the following condition is satisfied,
then GWC-TIN scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. The result on the symmetric case is stated in the following corollary. 9 Corollary 2 (Symmetric Gaussian channel). For the two-user symmetric Gaussian interference channel with α 11 = α 22 and α 12 = α 21 , if the condition of 0 ≤ α 12 α 11 ≤ 2 3 is satisfied, then GWC-TIN scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. Under this condition, the optimal secure sum capacity C sum satisfies
while the optimal secure sum GDoF is characterized by
IV. CONVERSE FOR THE DETERMINISTIC CHANNEL
For the deterministic channel defined in Section II-B, we provide a general outer bound on the secure capacity region, which is stated in the following lemma. Lemma 1. For the two-user deterministic interference channel defined in Section II-B, an outer bound of secure capacity region is given by
Before describing the proof of Lemma 1, we at first show how to prove Theorems 1 and 2 by using the result of Lemma 1. 
On the other hand, WoCJ scheme achieves a secure sum rate of R 1 + R 2 = (m 22 − m 12 ) + + (m 11 − m 21 ) + (see (11) and (12)), which matches the upper bound derived in (37). Therefore, WoCJ scheme achieves the optimal secure sum capacity if the conditions in (22) and (23) are satisfied.
Remark 2 (Converse proof of Theorem 2). Note that Theorem 2 is limited to the symmetric case with m d = m 11 = m 22 and m c = m 12 = m 21 . The converse of (26a) and (26b) in Theorem 2 follows from bound (34). The converse of (26c) -(26g) in Theorem 2 has been proved in [24] that considered the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel with transmitter cooperation. The result of [24] has been extended in this work to the general setting of the deterministic interference channel, stated in (32), (33), (35) and (36).
As mentioned in Remarks 1 and 2, bound (34) in Lemma 1 proves the optimality of the schemes without cooperative jamming in the declared regimes (see Theorems 1 and 2). In what follows we will provide the proof of (34), while the proofs of (32), (33), (35) and (36) are relegated to Appendix B. s11 represents the top (m11 − m12) + bits of x1, i.e., the interference-free bits sent from transmitter 1 to receiver 1. s12 represents the top m12 bits of x2, i.e., the signal bits sent from transmitter 2 to receiver 1.
A. Proof of bound (34)
For the proof of bound (34), our approach is different from the genie-aided approach that is commonly used in the settings without secrecy constraints (cf. [28] ). In the genie-aided approach, some genie-aided information is typically provided to the receivers, which might give a loose bound in our setting.
At first, let
that represents the top (most significant) τ bits of x k (t), and let x n k,1:τ {x k,1:τ (t)} n t=1 , for some positive τ and k = 1, 2. We also define that s 11 (t) x 1,1:(m 11 −m 12 ) + (t) (38) s 12 (t) x 2,1:m 12 (t).
(39)
In our context, s 11 (t) represents the top (m 11 − m 12 ) + bits of x 1 (t), while s 12 (t) represents the top m 12 bits of x 2 (t) (see Fig. 3 ). We begin with the rate of user 1:
nR 1 = H(w 1 ) = I(w 1 ; y n 1 ) + H(w 1 |y n 1 ) ≤ I(w 1 ; y n 1 ) + n 1,n (40) ≤ I(w 1 ; y n 1 ) − I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) + n 1,n + n
where (40) follows from Fano's inequality, lim n→∞ 1,n = 0; (41) results from secrecy constraint in (3), i.e., I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small . Similarly, for the rate of user 2 we have nR 2 ≤ I(w 2 ; y n 2 ) − I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) + n 2,n + n
which, together with (41), gives the following bound on the sum rate: nR 1 + nR 2 − n 1,n − n 2,n − 2n ≤ I(w 1 ; y n 1 ) − I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) + I(w 2 ; y n 2 ) − I(w 2 ; y n 1 ) = H(y n 1 ) − H(y n 1 |w 1 ) − H(y n 2 ) + H(y n 2 |w 1 ) + H(y n 2 ) − H(y n 2 |w 2 ) − H(y n 1 ) + H(y n 1 |w 2 ) = H(y n 2 |w 1 ) − H(y n 1 |w 1 ) + H(y n 1 |w 2 ) − H(y n 2 |w 2 ).
(43) 11 For the first two terms in the right-hand side of (43), we have:
H(y n 2 |w 1 ) − H(y n 1 |w 1 ) = H(s n 11 , y n 2 |w 1 ) − H(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 )
−H(s n 11 , y n 1 |w 1 ) + H(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 )
= H(s n 11 |w 1 ) + H(y n 2 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − H(s n 11 |w 1 ) − H(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 = H(y n 2 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − H(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 = H(s n 12 , y n 2 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − H(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 )
= H(s n 12 |s n 11 , w 1 ) + H(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 )
where J 1 H(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ), J 2 H(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ), J 3 H(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) and J 4 H(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ); the steps from (44) to (46) follow from chain rule; (47) follows from that H(s n 12 |s n 11 , w 1 ) =H(s n 12 ) (49) =H(s n 12 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 )
where (49) and (50) use the fact that s n 12 is independent of s n 11 , w 1 and x n 1 ; (51) follows from the fact that H(a|b) = H(a ⊕ b|b) for any random a, b ∈ F q 2 . Going back to (48), we further have H(y n 2 |w 1 ) − H(y n 1 |w 1 ) = −I(y n 1 ; x n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 − J 3 + J 4 (52)
where (52) is from (48); (53) follows from the fact that mutual information and entropy are always nonnegative; (54) follows from Lemma 2 (see below). Similarly, by interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, we also have
Finally, combining (43), (54) and (55) gives the following bound on the sum rate
Letting n → ∞, 1,n → 0, 2,n → 0 and → 0, we get the desired bound (34). The lemma used in our proof is provided below.
Lemma 2. For J 2 = H(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ) and J 4 = H(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ), we have
(57) The solid pipe lines are associated with the bits that can be reconstructed from either s11 or s12, while the dash pipe lines are associated with the bits that can not be reconstructed from {s11, s12}. Therefore, s11 and s12 can reconstruct all the bits except max{(m21−(m11−m12) + ) + , (m22−m12) + } least significant bits of y 2 . For example, when m11 = m22 = 3 and m12 = m21 = 2, then s11 and s12 can reconstruct all the bits except one least significant bit of y 2 .
Proof. Begin with J 2 , we have:
where (58) results from chain rule; (59) uses the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; (60) follows from the fact that s 11 (t) can be reconstructed from y 1 (t) (see Fig. 3 ). Now we focus on the upper bound of J 4 : J 4 = H(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ) = n t=1 H(y 2 (t)|y t−1 2 , s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ) (61)
where (61) results from chain rule; (62) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; (63) holds true because, s 12 (t) and s 11 (t) allow for the reconstruction of all the bits except max{m 21 − (m 11 − m 12 ) + , m 22 − m 12 , 0} least significant bits of y 2 (t). As shown in Fig. 4 , s 11 (t) represents the top (m 11 − m 12 ) + bits of x 1 (t), which indicates that s 11 (t) can reconstruct the top (m 11 − m 12 ) + bits of the cross-link signal sent from transmitter 1 to receiver 2. The (m 21 − (m 11 − m 12 ) + ) + least significant bits of cross-link signal sent from transmitter 1 to receiver 2 could not be recovered from s 11 (t). Similarly, s 12 (t) can reconstruct the top m 12 bits, but not the (m 22 − m 12 ) + least significant bits, of the direct-link signal sent from transmitter 2 to receiver 2. Therefore, s 12 (t) and s 11 (t) can reconstruct partial bits of y 2 (t), leaving max{(m 21 −(m 11 −m 12 ) + ) + , (m 22 −m 12 ) + } least significant bits of y 2 (t) unreconstructable. 13 V. CONVERSE FOR THE GAUSSIAN CHANNEL For the Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, we provide an upper bound on the secure sum capacity, which is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For the two-user Gaussian interference channel defined in Section II-A, the secure sum capacity is upper bounded by where (65) results from bound (64), as well as the facts that P α 22 −α 12 ≥ P α 22 −(α 11 −α 12 ) + and that P α 11 −α 21 ≥ P α 11 −(α 22 −α 21 ) + under the two conditions in (27) and (28). On the other hand, GWC-TIN scheme described in Section II-D achieves a secure sum rate of
(see (20) and (21)). One can easily check that the gap between the secure sum capacity lower bound in (66) and upper bound in (65) is no more than 10 bits/channel use. Note that, the gap can be further reduced by optimizing the computations in converse and achievability.
Let us now prove Lemma 3. The proof follows closely from that derived for the deterministic case (see Section IV-A). At first we define that s 11 (t) √ P (α 11 −α 12 ) + e jθ 11 x 1 (t) +z 1 (t) (67)
wherez 1 (t) ∼ CN (0, 1) is a virtual noise that is independent of the other noise and transmitted signals. By following the steps of (40) -(43) derived in Section IV-A, we can bound the sum rate of this Gaussian channel as
Then, following the steps of (44) -(48) gives:
h(y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |w 1 ) = h(s n 11 , y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 )
−h(s n 11 , y n 1 |w 1 ) + h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 )
= h(y n 2 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 = h(s n 12 , y n 2 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 )
= h(s n 12 |s n 11 , w 1 ) + h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 )
= h(y n 1 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 − J 3 + J 4 (72) = −I(y n 1 ; x n 1 |s n 11 , w 1 ) − J 1 + J 2 − J 3 + J 4 (73) 14 where J 1 h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ), J 2 h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ), J 3 h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) and J 4 h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ); the steps from (70) to (71) follow from chain rule; (72) stems from that h(s n 12 |s n 11 , w 1 ) =h(s n 12 ) (74) =h(s n 12 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 ) (75) =h({ √ P α 12 e jθ 12 x 2 (t) + z 1 (t)} n t=1 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 ) =h({ √ P α 11 e jθ 11 x 1 (t) + √ P α 12 e jθ 12 x 2 (t) + z 1 (t)} n t=1 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 ) (76) =h(y n 1 |x n 1 , s n 11 , w 1 ) where (74) and (75) use the fact that s n 12 is independent of s n 11 , w 1 and x n 1 ; (76) follows from that h(a|b) = h(a + b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b. Going back to (73), we further have h(y n 2 |w 1 ) − h(y n 1 |w 1 ) = −I(y n 1 ; x n 1 |s n 11 ,
where (77) is from (73); (78) stems from the nonnegativity of mutual information; (79) follows from Lemma 4 (see below). Similarly, by interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, we also have
Finally, combining (69), (79) and (80) gives the following bound on the sum rate
By setting n → ∞, 1,n → 0, 2,n → 0 and → 0, we get the desired bound (64). The lemma used in our proof is provided below.
Lemma 4. For J 1 = h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ), J 2 = h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ), J 3 = h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) and J 4 = h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ), we have
Proof. See Appendix A.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This work showed that a simple scheme without cooperative jamming (i.e., GWC-TIN scheme) can indeed achieve the secure sum capacity to within a constant gap in a regime (see (27) and (28)) of the two-user Gaussian interference channel. In this GWC-TIN scheme, each transmitter uses a Gaussian wiretap codebook, while each receiver treats interference as noise when decoding the desired message. In this simple scheme, the transmitters do not need to know the information of the channel phases. For the deterministic interference channel model, this work identified a regime (see (22) and (23)) in which a simple scheme without using cooperative jamming (i.e., WoCJ scheme) is optimal in terms of secure sum capacity. For the symmetric case of the deterministic model, the identified regime (i.e., 0 ≤ α ≤ 2/3) is indeed a sufficient and necessary regime for WoCJ scheme to be optimal. In the future work, it would be interesting to determine whether the conditions in (22) and (23) are also necessary for WoCJ scheme 15 to be optimal, for the general deterministic interference channel. For the general Gaussian interference channel, again, it would be interesting to determine whether the conditions (27) and (28) are also necessary for GWC-TIN scheme to be optimal in terms of secure sum capacity to within a constant gap. Another direction of the future work is to study on the optimality of the secure communication without using cooperative jamming in some other channels, such as k-user interference channel and wiretap channel with helper. APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 4 Remind that J 1 = h(s n 11 |y n 2 , w 1 ), J 2 = h(s n 11 |y n 1 , w 1 ), J 3 = h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ), J 4 = h(y n 2 |s n 12 , s n 11 , w 1 ), s 11 (t) = √ P (α 11 −α 12 ) + e jθ 11 x 1 (t) +z 1 (t), and s 12 (t) = √ P α 12 e jθ 12 x 2 (t) + z 1 (t). At first we focus on the lower bound of J 1 :
where (86) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (87) follows from the fact that h(a|b) = h(a − b|b) for any continuous random variables a and b; the last equality holds true because h(z 1 (t)) = log(πe). Similarly, we have J 3 = h(s n 12 |y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) ≥ h(s n 12 |x n 2 , y n 2 , s n 11 , w 1 ) = h({z 1 (t)} n t=1 ) = n log(πe). Now we focus on the upper bound of J 2 :
≤ n log(πe(2 + (
where (88) results from chain rule; (89) and (91) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (90) uses the fact that h(a|b) = h(a − βb|b) for a constant β; (92) follows from the fact that h z 1 (t) + β 0 e jθ 11 x 1 (t) − β 1 e jθ 12 x 2 (t) − β 2 z 1 (t) ≤ log(πe(1 + β 2 0 + β 2 1 + β 2 2 )) for constants β 0 , β 1 and β 2 ; (93) uses the identities that 0 ≤ √ P (α 11 −α 12 ) + − √ P α 11 −α 12 ≤ 1 and that P −α 12 ≤ 1. Remind that P ≥ 1, α k ≥ 0, ∀k, ∈ {1, 2}, and (•) + = max{0, •}.
Similarly, we have the following upper bound on J 4 :
where (94) results from chain rule; (95) and (97) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces differential entropy; (96) uses the fact that h(a|b, c) = h(a − β 1 b − β 2 c|b, c) for constants β 1 and β 2 ; the last inequality stems from the fact that h z 2 (t) − β 3 e j(θ 22 −θ 12 ) z 1 (t) − β 4 e j(θ 21 −θ 11 )z 1 (t) ≤ log(πe(1 + β 2 3 + β 2 4 )) for constants β 3 and β 4 . At this point we complete the proof. Let us at first prove bound (32). Note that bound (33) can be proved in a similar way. Beginning with Fano's inequality, we can bound the rate of receiver 1 as: where lim n→∞ 1,n = 0; (98) stems from the Markov chain of w 1 → x n 1,1:m 11 → y n 1 ; (99) results from the fact that adding information does not decrease the mutual information; (100) results from the secrecy constraint, i.e., I(w 1 ; y n 2 ) ≤ n for an arbitrary small (cf. (3)); (101) follows from the fact that I(w 1 ; x n 2,1:(min{m 11 ,m 21 }−(m 21 −m 22 ) + ) + |y n 2 ) ≤ n · (min{m 11 , m 21 } − (m 21 − m 22 ) + ) + , and the fact that x n 1,1:min{m 11 ,m 21 } can be reconstructed from {y n 2 , x n 2,1:(min{m 11 ,m 21 }−(m 21 −m 22 ) + ) + } (see Fig. 5 ); (102) follows from the identity that (a 1 − a 2 ) + + a 3 − a 1 = a 3 − min{a 1 , a 2 } for any real numbers a 1 , a 2 and a 3 . Letting n → ∞, 1,n → 0 and → 0, it gives bound (32). By interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, bound (33) can be proved in a similar way.
B. Proof of bounds (35) and (36)
In what follows we will prove bound (35). Bound (36) can be proved in a similar way. Beginning with Fano's inequality, we can bound the rate of receiver 1 as: is secure from the unintended receiver. The transmission of common data (a1 for transmitter 1 and b1 for transmitter 2) is also secure by using cooperative jamming signal (u1 for transmitter 1 and v1 for transmitter 2).
= H(y n 1 ) − H(x n 2,1:m 12 |x n 1 ) + n 1,n (110) = H(y n 1 ) − H(x n 2,1:m 12 ) + n 1,n
where (108) results from Fano's inequality; (109) follows from the Markov chain of w 1 → x n 1 → y n 1 ; (110) results from the definition of y 1 (t) = S q−m 11 x 1 (t) ⊕ S q−m 12 x 2 (t) (cf. (7)); (111) follows from the independence between x n 1 and x n 2 . In a similar way, we have nR 2 ≤ H(y n 2 ) − H(x n 1,1:m 21 ) + n 2,n .
Finally, by combing (107), (111) and (112), it gives where (113) follows from the facts that H(y n 1 ) ≤ n · max{m 11 , m 12 }, that H(x n 1,1:max{m 11 ,m 21 } ) − H(x n 1,1:m 21 ) ≤ n·(max{m 11 , m 21 }−m 21 ) = n·(m 11 −m 21 ) + , and that H(x n 2,1:max{m 12 ,m 22 } )−H(x n 2,1:m 12 ) ≤ n · (m 22 − m 12 ) + . By setting n → ∞, 1,n , 2,n → 0 and → 0, it gives bound (35). By interchanging the roles of user 1 and user 2, bound (36) can be proved in a similar way.
APPENDIX C A SKETCH OF THE COOPERATIVE JAMMING SCHEMES FOR THEOREM 2
For the two-user symmetric deterministic interference channel, the work in [25] has proposed some schemes with cooperative jamming that are optimal when 2 3 < α < 1 and 1 < α < 2, in terms of secure sum secure capacity. This section just provides a sketch of these cooperative jamming schemes, as more details could be found in [25] . In these cooperative jamming schemes, each transmitter generally sends one or more of the following signals: 1) private data signal, which can only be seen by its desired receiver; 2) common data signal, which can be received by both receivers; 3) jamming signal, which can be used to jam the unintended common data signal to guarantee secrecy.
For the case of 2 3 < α ≤ 3 4 , at each time each transmitter sends a total of 2m c −m d bits of data, consisting of m d − m c bits of private data and 3m c − 2m d bits of common data. In this case, the transmission of both private data and common data is secure from the corresponding eavesdropper by using cooperative jamming (see Fig. 6 on the setting with m d = 4 and m c = 3).
For the case of 3 4 < α ≤ 1, at each time each transmitter sends a total of m d − 2 3 m c bits of data, consisting of m d − m c bits of private data and mc 3 bits of common data. For simplicity of exposition, we focus on the setting with m d = 7 and m c = 6, and depict the optimal scheme in Fig. 7 . As can be Fig. 7 . Optimal scheme for the symmetric deterministic channel with m d = 7 and mc = 6. At each time, each transmitter sends a total of m d − 2 3 mc = 3 bits of data, consisting of m d − mc = 1 bit of private data and mc 3 = 2 bits of common data. The transmission of private data (a3 for transmitter 1 and b3 for transmitter 2) is secure from the unintended receiver. The transmission of common data (a1, a2 for transmitter 1 and b1, b2 for transmitter 2) is also secure by using cooperative jamming signal (u1, u2 for transmitter 1 and v1, v2 for transmitter 2). Fig. 8 . Optimal scheme for the symmetric deterministic channel with m d = 5 and mc = 6. At each time, each transmitter sends a total of mc 3 bits of common data. The transmission of common data (a1, a2 for transmitter 1 and b1, b2 for transmitter 2) is secure by utilizing cooperative jamming. seen in Fig. 7 , the transmission of both private data and common data is secure from the corresponding eavesdropper.
For the case of 1 < α < 3 2 , each transmitter sends a total of mc 3 bits of common data per channel time. The optimal scheme is depicted in Fig. 8 on the setting with m d = 5 and m c = 6.
For the case of 3 2 ≤ α < 2, each transmitter sends a total of 2m d − m c bits of common data per channel time. The optimal scheme is depicted in Fig. 9 on the setting with m d = 2 and m c = 3. 
